We address the issue of how software components are affected by the failure of one of them, and the inverse problem of locating the faulty component. Because of the functional form of the incoming link distribution of software dependence network, software is fragile with respect to the failure of a random single component. Locating a faulty component is easy if the failure only affects its nearest neighbors, while it is hard if it propagates further.
Large scale research on small-world networks began a few years ago after the introduction by Watts and Strogatz of their famous model [1] . During the last few years, many real-life networks turned out to be of small-world nature with a scale-free link distribution [2] . The digital world seems particularly rich in this type of network at all scales: wires in computers [3] , software function calls [8] , source-file dependencies [5] , software modules [4, 8, 9, 10, 11] , Internet physical network [6] , and links between web pages [7] . Are notably missing the networks between software packages, which will be measured in the first part of this paper.
Whereas previous work looked for reasonable explanations of why software networks are scale-free [8, 11] , we address here bug propagation and debugging in scale-free networks, a major issue that has been neglected so far. We shall argue that software scale-free networks provide a natural explanation of software fragility.
Scale-free networks in software were recently investigated in a game and in the Java API (application programming interface) [4] . The nodes were respectively the modules of the game (sound, graphics, etc) and the objects of the standard Java API. In both cases, scalefree networks were discovered. As noted in subsequent work [8, 9, 10] , Ref. [4] did not take into account the directed nature of these networks, which are asymmetric. All these work focus on microscopic software components, such as functions and objects. Here we study the dependence between program packages in a Linux distribution, an important structure which has not been investigated yet, completing the hierarchy of scale-free networks found in the digital world. We then discuss the fragility of software with respect to the failure of a single component and the difficulty of debugging. As large networks are required for this study, we shall also use function call networks of open-source projects.
Let us first study software components: a computer uses a collection of software components that are linked through a network of dependence. For instance a program that displays some text needs fonts that can be provided by another component. In Linux distributions, pieces of software are often provided as packages. As the name indicates, a package is a collection of software components. The rpm command can be used to extract the network of package dependences. More precisely, rpm -q --whatrequires myprogram lists all the packages that needs myprogram, making it easy to build the package adjacency matrix. One of us wrote a program called rpmgraph that produces a diagram of this network [12] . We studied an installation of RedHat 8.0 that contained 1460 packages. The cumulative density P ≥ (q) = P (q ′ ≥ q) of the number of incoming links q per package, is plotted in Fig. 1 ; we normalize P ≥ (q) so that P ≥ (1) = 1, which amounts to leave out of P ≥ (q) the nodes that are not needed by any other node. The distribution P ≥ (q) has not enough points to be fitted accurately with a power-law. The cumulative distribution of outgoing links, P ≥ (k) for k > 0, is also plotted in Fig.  1 . The asymmetry between the outgoing and incoming The rpm command can give partial access to a more detailed network: using the option --requires instead of --whatrequires lists which components inside packages are needed by a given package. In other words, a package is made up of a number of sub-packages, each of them needing sub-packages of other packages. As the rpm command can only be applied to a package, the sub-package dependency network cannot be extracted, and we are left with the distribution of the number of incoming links, and a coarse grained distribution of outgoing links. This provides however a much more convincing evidence for the power-law nature of the incoming link distribution: a fit over the whole dataset gives P ≥ (q) ∝ q −α+1 with α ≃ 2.0. Fig. 2 shows that the numbers of incoming and outgoing links of a given software package are generally correlated, a property also seen in links between functions in source code [8] . Simply put, this shows that some packages such as libraries provide a functionality to other programs. As we shall see below, this is one of the causes of software fragility.
In order to study bug propagation, we need better, more precise data. Therefore we will make use of function call networks: In the latter, functions are the nodes, and function calls are the links: in the following example written in C, int f(int x){ return 2*g(x); } f calls g, hence links to g. Large open-source programs are ideal candidates for investigation. Refs [8, 11] considered the largest connected component. We are interested here in whole networks, as we focus on bug dynamics and debugging. We studied Linux kernel 2.4.18, Mozilla Internet browser 1.3a, mySQL database 4.0.2, and Apache web server 2.0.32. Extracting the function call network from a source code written in C was done using simple scripts. We excluded C-keywords from the graph. Fig. 3 reports that P ≥ (q) is also a power-law. It is noticeable that these data seem to suffer from finite size effects similar to those seen for the package dependences, the more data points, the closer to 2 the exponent. We emphasize here that α = 2 is the value that marks the border where the average number of times a piece of software is used diverges when the size of the network goes to infinity. This is possible in software because being reused does not cost anything to a piece of software. Therefore, the average number of programs that use a given piece of software is free to diverge with the size of the network. The regularity of the incoming link distribution exponent suggests some sort of universality: the source code and program networks, that is, the micro-and mesoscopic levels re-spectively, have roughly the same incoming link exponent. The latter is also very close to exponents measured in macroscopic networks of links between web pages and web sites, that is, of the phenomenology resulting from the actual use of computers and programs. At all levels, being linked is free for the nodes. On the other hand, Fig 4 shows the outgoing distribution, which may have power-law parts, but it is impossible to assert it from our data, because we have less than a decade of straight line. Previous work fitted these distribution with a power-law P ≥ (k) ∝ k −β+1 in the part that correspond to k ≤ 10 here and found exponents β ≃ 2.4. If this is the case, there are strong cutoffs, much stronger than for the incoming link distribution. On the other hand, it seems as reasonable to fit the part 10 < k < 100 with a power law, in which case a much larger exponent (more than 4) is found. However, we only conclude from this graph that the asymmetry between incoming and outgoing link distribution is considerable, which is enough for our purpose.
There are indeed special reasons for this asymmetry being more pronounced in software than in other structures. As pointed out by Ref. [8] , the asymmetry itself is due to software reuse: some pieces of software are designed to provide functionalities that other programs can use. In addition, writing a program, hence linking to previously written piece of software, is costly. As the number of dependences of a program is related to its complexity, the average number of outgoing links cannot diverge. Remarkably, the asymmetry of distributions is less pronounced for instance in links between web pages. We argue that linking to a web page can be almost free, in contrast to the amount of work needed to write software pieces, which needs a logical structure, hence the large asymmetry found here.
This leads us to bug propagation. Software is well known to be fragile. As we shall argue in the following, this is due in part to its structure. Assume that all the nodes but one, drawn at random, are perfectly working. What is the consequence of this imperfection? Software failures actually propagate on the dependence graph: if a node (function or software package) is faulty, the nodes calling it are likely to work less than optimally; by extension the nodes calling a node that calls the faulty node will probably be affected, etc. This also raise the question of how hard is it to locate the faulty node?
Interestingly, the failure can also propagate from a microscopic software structure to a macroscopic one. For instance, a function trying to access a memory address outside the allocated memory space can crash the whole program to which it belongs. If it does, the problem now lies at the level of software packages. If the operating system has no memory protection, this causes a system crash. Then, if other computers depend on the system that went down, they will also be affected.
In this paper, we shall focus on a simpler problem by making simplifying assumptions on the influence of a single bug. As many bugs are not nearly as dangerous as illegal memory access, but (annoying) imperfections, or faults, their influence is not as dramatic. Therefore, we assume that the influence of a faulty node is only determined by the dependence network to which it belongs. A node is either working (contains no bug), faulty (contains a bug), or affected by a bug.
[21]
First we consider the simple optimistic case where only the nearest neighbors are affected by a faulty node. The asymmetry of the structure implies that the bug propagates to a typically large number of nodes. On the other hand, once an incorrect behavior is detected, locating the faulty node is easy. Therefore, in the most optimistic case, software is fragile, but fixing it is relatively easy once an anomaly is detected.
This view is however too simplistic: as shown by the illegal memory example, bugs do propagate further than their next neighbors. Let us be pessimistic, and assume that they propagate as far as possible: if a node is faulty, all the nodes that point to it directly or indirectly are equally affected. In contrast to virus propagation, bug influence is instantaneous. We are now left with the study of the properties of influence basins. Of particular interest is the influence basin size distribution P (b) which can be computed by iterating the graph matrix G [15] . The dependence of i on j is denoted by G i,j = 1, (G i,j = 0 otherwise). Element (G n ) i,j contains the number of paths of length n between i and j, hence, in order to compute the basin size distribution, one needs to compute the B = N k=0 G k where N is the number of nodes. If i belongs to the influence basin of j, B i,j > 0. The size of failure propagation basin of node j is then simply given by b j = i sign(B i,j ). Figure 5 shows an inverse Zipf plot of measured basin sizes: such a plot consists in ranking the basins according to their sizes and plotting the rank r versus b [13] . This is equivalent to integrat- 
The exponents of the power-laws seem to be either −2 (Mozilla) or −5/2 (Linux); the exponent of Apache is unclear. A −2 exponent was also obtained for the basins of Internet physical network [18] .
One can also define a debugging basin: suppose that a piece of software i is affected by the failure of another program, but is not buggy itself; what is the maximum number of pieces of software w i = j B i,j that are to be inspected in order to locate the faulty node? Given the asymmetry of incoming and outgoing link distribution, one would naively expect that P (b) and P (w) differ notably. This is clearly not the case: the debugging basin distributions seem to follow closely their associated bug influence basins distributions, and share roughly the same exponents (see Fig 5) , although P (w) is not as smooth as P (b), making it difficult to fit it.
This similarity is also seen in the package dependence network ( fig 6) where P (b) and P (w) have power-law parts both with same exponent −3/2; note that our dataset is too small to allow being definitive. In addition, the bug influence basis distribution as a early cut-off.
It is tempting to relate the similarity between the exponents of the two basin distributions to branching processes, which describe random tree growth. Starting from a root node (generation 0), at time t each node i of generation t − 1 branches into a random number r i (t) of new nodes. The average number of new nodes r in the subtree is called the branching ratio. Of particular interest to us is the following property: if r = 1, the subtree (i.e. basin) size probability distribution of a randomly drawn node P (b) ∼ b −3/2 . If r > 1 and [16] ; if the branching variance r 2 is infinite, any exponent can be obtained [17] . These results do not apply directly to software structures, as the latter are not perfect trees. But what branching processes suggest is that the exponent of basin distributions is controlled by the branching ratio and variance. The branching ratio is nothing else than the average number of outgoing links k or incoming links q in the context of software structures, and both are equal. If the outgoing link distribution is a power-law and has an exponent small than 3, both branching variances are infinite. At first, this provides an intuitive although incomplete explanation of why the basin distribution exponents are the same. Although the analogy is not perfect, it may be that there is also some sort of universality with respect to basin distributions in these networks, since the exponent found seem to be multiples of 1/2. This is an interesting open challenge. The question is whether larger exponents, hence more robust and easier-to-debug software, can be obtained at all. If the answer is negative, the fragility software and the difficulty of debugging are doomed not to be bounded in the worst case.
A still simple but more realistic model of bug propagation consists in assuming that a node linking to a faulty or affected node is itself affected with probability p. The rationale is the following: assume that node i calls node j. In the context of software packages, p takes into account the fact that j, the faulty/affected node contains sub-packages (see above) which are typically not all defective/affected. Similarly, the sub-packages of i do not all link to a faulty sub-package of j. For instance, if there are n sub-packages in both i and j, and if there are f faulty sub-packages in j, and if every sub-package of i has l links that point each to a randomly chosen subpackage of j, using elementary combinatorics, one finds for n − f > l,
where n−f l / n l is the probability that all the l links point to a working function. Assuming that p is constant for all the links in the network, one is left with a bond percolation problem for directed graphs. It is known that if the exponent of the link distribution is smaller than 3 [20] , with probability 1 a finite fraction of the network belongs to a percolation cluster, which means that the influence of single bug is likely to be as large as if p = 1 for any value of p. Therefore, the picture drawn in the previous paragraph and figs 5 and 6 still applies. On the other hand, the short-tailed nature of the outgoing link distribution implies that the basin of debugging depends on the value of p: there is a critical value p c of p such that for p c < p, debugging is easy, while debugging is hard if p > p c .
Finally, another cause for software fragility comes from the peculiar role played by libraries. As shown in fig 2, software packages that are meant to be reused are accordingly more often linked to. When a program is installed or upgraded, it often happens that it needs an updated version of some library. The dilemma, known as "DLL hell" in Windows operating systems, is the following: if one does not install the new version of the library, the new program is likely not to work properly. If one updates the library, all the programs that link to its old version are susceptible to be broken. This provides a natural mechanism for progressive worsening of operating system instability. There are two solutions: either one implements a way of using several version of libraries at the same time, or one systematically upgrades all the programs using the library in question. Assuming that new versions of programs are available, the first possibility applies mostly to commercial programs, because the cost associated with upgrading expensive software may be very high; the second solution is the way for instance Linux distributions work, but leads sometimes to upgrading a very large number of programs, which is frowned up by the users. At any rate, one should not underestimate the importance of this problem: not only the distribution of incoming links implies that the average number of affected programs diverges with the system size, but even worse, as shown by fig 2, libraries are characterized by an even larger number of incoming links.
In conclusion, we argued that the fragility of software can be in part attributed to its very structure, which unfortunately seems to arise naturally from optimization considerations.
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